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Abstract
This study explores the implications of parental preference for education in an innovation-
driven growth model that features an interaction between endogenous technological progress
and human capital accumulation. Parents invest in childrens education partly due to the
preference for their children to be educated. We consider a preference parameter that
measures the degree of this parental preference for education. We nd that a society such
as China in which parents place a high value on education accumulates more human capi-
tal, which is conducive to innovation, but the larger education investment also crowds out
resources for R&D investment. As a result, a stronger parental preference for education
has an inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate due to the presence
of both positive and negative e¤ects. We also analytically derive the complete transitional
path of the equilibrium growth rate and nd that an increase in the degree of education
preference causes an initial negative e¤ect on growth. Furthermore, we explore the ro-
bustness of our results in a scale-invariant extension of the model and nd that although
the crowding-out e¤ect of education preference gradually disappears in the long run, it
continues to exert a negative e¤ect on the transitional growth rate. Therefore, a society
that has a stronger preference for education would have a lower initial growth rate but
also a higher long-run growth rate.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the Chinese society places a very high value on education. In Chinas
Song Dynasty, Emperor Zhenzong (968-1022) wrote his famous Urge to Study Poem in which
an often quoted verse is "in books one nds golden mansions and maidens as beautiful as jade."
Also in the Song Dynasty, a poet, Wang Zhu, wrote in his famous Child Prodigy Poem, "all
pursuits are of low value; only studying the books is high." This emphasis on education can
be traced back to Confucianism, which emphasizes the importance of education. Studying the
origins of this strong preference for education in China, Kipnis (2011) notes that education
"invokes a system of prestige in which those with educational accomplishments are marked as
superior to the non-educated." Even in the case of Chinese families in the US, this parental
preference for education still exerts inuences on parentsinvolvement in childrens education.
For example, from their survey data, Chen and Uttal (1988) nd that Chinese parents have
higher expectations on their childrens academic achievement and spend more time working
with children on their homework than American parents. Furthermore, Chen and Uttal (1988)
argue that these di¤erent behaviors can be explained by di¤erences in cultural values.1 However,
is a strong parental preference for education necessarily good for the economy? A BBC News
article2 discusses the costs of this "education fever" in China as well as South Korea, which
also shares the Confucian values, and reports that in South Korea, "the government believes
education obsessionis damaging society".
In this study, we use a growth-theoretic framework to explore the macroeconomic impli-
cations of a strong parental preference for education. The growth-theoretic framework is an
innovation-driven growth model that features an interaction between endogenous technological
progress and human capital accumulation. Parents invest in their childrens human capital
due to the subjective utility that they derive from their childrens education. We consider a
preference parameter that measures the degree of this parental preference for education. We
nd that a society such as China in which parents place a high value on education accumulates
more human capital, which is conducive to innovation, but the larger education investment
also crowds out resources for R&D investment. As a result, a stronger parental preference for
education has an inverted-U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate due to the pres-
ence of both positive and negative e¤ects. Furthermore, if the degree of parental preference for
education is su¢ ciently low or high, the economy would be trapped in a stagnant equilibrium
with zero economic growth in the long run.
We also analytically derive the complete transitional path of the equilibrium growth rate
from the initial steady state to the new steady state when the degree of parental preference
for education increases. We nd that an increase in the degree of education preference has
an initial negative e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate due to the crowding-out e¤ect of
education investment on R&D investment. However, as the level of human capital increases, the
equilibrium growth rate also increases due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation.
The new steady-state equilibrium growth rate may be higher or lower than the initial growth
rate, depending on the relative magnitude of the negative crowding-out e¤ect of education
investment and the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation and growth.
1See also Huang and Gove (2012) for a discussion of Confucianisms inuence on the Chinese culture and
educational practice of Chinese families in the United States.
2"Asias Parents Su¤ering Education Fever". BBC News, 22 October 2013.
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Furthermore, we explore the robustness of our results in a scale-invariant extension of the
model and nd that although the crowding-out e¤ect of education preference gradually disap-
pears in the long run, it continues to exert a negative e¤ect on the transitional growth rate.
Therefore, in both versions of the model, an increase in the degree of parental preference for ed-
ucation indeed has a certain "damaging" e¤ect on the society by temporarily slowing down the
growth rate of the economy. The underlying assumption behind this negative e¤ect is that par-
ents investing more of their time in their childrens education carries an opportunity cost that
crowds out other productive activities. For example, a recent SCMP News article3 describes
a growing trend of educated parents in China quitting their careers to educate their children.
However, this negative short-run e¤ect on economic growth can be o¤set by a positive long-run
e¤ect of accumulating more human capital. Therefore, a society that has a stronger preference
for education would have a lower initial growth rate but also a higher long-run growth rate.
This study contributes to the literature on R&D-driven innovation and economic growth.4
Early studies in this literature do not consider human capital accumulation. More recent
studies, such as Eicher (1996), Zeng (1997, 2003), Strulik (2005, 2007), Strulik et al. (2013),
Chu et al. (2013), Hashimoto and Tabata (2016) and Prettner and Strulik (2016), explore
human capital accumulation and its interaction with endogenous technological progress in the
R&D-based growth model. However, these studies either do not explore the e¤ects of parental
preference for education or they nd an unambiguously positive e¤ect of education preference on
growth. By analytically deriving the transitional dynamics, we show that although an increase
in the degree of parental preference for education can have a positive e¤ect on the steady-state
equilibrium growth rate, it also has a negative e¤ect on the transitional growth rate due to the
negative crowding-out e¤ect of education.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model.
Section 3 explores the implications of parental preference for education. Section 4 analyzes a
scale-invariant extension of the model. The nal section concludes.
2 The benchmark model
We consider a discrete-time version of the seminal R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990).
We extend the Romer model by considering a simple structure of overlapping generations and
human capital accumulation. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time to be allocated
between leisure, work and the education of her child.5 We follow previous studies6 to assume
3"Home Freer: Chinese Mothers Quit Jobs to Care for the Kids". South China Morning Post, 9 November
2015.
4See Romer (1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
for seminal studies in this literature.
5In this study, we do not consider endogenous fertility; see for example Chu et al. (2013), Strulik et al. (2013),
Prettner and Strulik (2016) and Hashimoto and Tabata (2016) for an analysis of human capital accumulation
and endogenous fertility in the R&D-based growth model. In the case of China, the number of children was
not freely chosen by most parents due to the one-child policy, which has been recently changed to a two-child
policy.
6See for example Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Futagami and Yanagihara (2008). In this literature on
parental investment in human capital and economic growth, studies focus on human capital accumulation as the
sole engine of economic growth. The present study complements these studies by exploring parental investment
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that individuals derive utility from their childrens education. Furthermore, they supply labor
that is embodied with human capital to earn a wage income. For simplicity, we follow previous
studies to assume that individuals only consume goods when they are old. In this case, they
save all of their wage income when they are young and consume their asset income when they
are old.
2.1 Individuals
In each generation, there is a unit continuum of individuals. An individual who works at time
t has the following utility function indexed by a superscript t:
U t = u(lt; Ct+1; Ht+1) =  ln lt + lnCt+1 +  lnHt+1. (1)
lt denotes the individuals leisure at time t, and the parameter   0 captures leisure preference.7
Ct+1 denotes the individuals consumption at time t+1. Ht+1 denotes the level of human capital
possessed by the individuals child. The parameter  > 0 measures the degree of parental
preference for education (i.e.,  is the utility weight that an individual places on her childs
human capital). The amount of time et a parent invests in her childs education determines her
level of human capital according to the following equation:
Ht+1 = et + (1  )Ht, (2)
where  > 0 is an education e¢ ciency parameter and  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of
human capital that the parent passes onto her child.8 Following previous studies, we assume
for simplicity that education is the only form of bequest.
Individuals use their remaining time endowment 1   lt   et combined with their human
capital Ht to earn a wage income wt(1  lt  et)Ht. Given that individuals consume only when
they are old, their consumption at time t+ 1 is given by
Ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)wt(1  lt   et)Ht, (3)
where rt+1 is the real interest rate. Substituting (2) and (3) into (1), we can express an
individuals optimization problem as follows.
max
et; lt
U t =  ln lt + ln[(1 + rt+1)wt(1  lt   et)Ht] +  ln[et + (1  )Ht],
taking frt+1; wt; Htg as given. The utility-maximizing levels of lt and et are respectively
lt = 
+ (1  )Ht
(1 +  + )
, (4)
in human capital as well as its interaction with endogenous technological progress.
7We consider endogenous leisure to allow individuals to choose between reducing their time spent on leisure
and work when they want to increase their time spent on their childrens education. Our results are robust to
the absence of endogenous leisure (i.e.,  = 0).
8Our results are robust to  ! 1 (i.e., parentshuman capital does not transfer to their children).
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et =
   (1 + )(1  )Ht
 (1 +  + )
. (5)
Substituting (5) into (2) yields the level of human capital at time t+ 1 as
Ht+1 =

1 +  + 
[+ (1  )Ht] , (6)
which is the accumulation equation of human capital and shows that the dynamics of Ht is
stable. Therefore, given any initial H0, Ht always converges to its steady state.
In the steady state, the level of leisure is l = =(1 +  + ), which is decreasing in ,
whereas the level of education is e = =(1 +  + ), which is increasing in . The steady-
state level of human capital is H = =(1 +  + ), which is also increasing in . However,
the steady-state level of human-capital-embodied labor supply is
(1  l   e)H = 
(1 +  + )2
, (7)
which is an inverted-U function of . The negative e¤ect of  on human-capital-embodied
labor supply is due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education, which is captured by 1  l   e =
1=(1++). Intuitively, an increase in  causes parents to devote more time to their childrens
education e. As a result, they have to devote less of their time to other productive activities.
Although they also reduce leisure l, the reduction in l only partly o¤sets the increase in e,
resulting into an overall decrease in 1  l   e.
2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function:
Yt = H
1 
Y;t
NtX
i=1
Xt (i), (8)
where HY;t is human-capital-embodied labor devoted to production and Xt(i) is intermediate
good i 2 [1; Nt]. The rms take as given the output price (normalized to unity) and input prices
wt and pt(i). The familiar conditional demand functions for HY;t and Xt(i) are respectively
wt = (1  )Yt=HY;t, (9)
pt(i) =  [HY;t=Xt(i)]
1  . (10)
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a number of di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 [1; Nt]. We consider the following
simple production process that is commonly used in the literature. Specically, we assume that
one unit of intermediate goods is produced by one unit of nal goods. In this case, the prot
function is given by
t(i) = pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i). (11)
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The familiar unconstrained prot-maximizing price is pt(i) = 1=. Here we follow Goh and
Olivier (2002) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) to introduce patent breadth  > 1 as a policy
variable,9 such that
pt(i) = minf; 1=g. (12)
We focus on the more realistic case in which  < 1=.10 Substituting pt(i) =  into (10) shows
that Xt(i) = Xt for all i 2 [1; Nt]. In this case, (11) becomes
t = (  1)Xt = (  1)



1=(1 )
HY;t, (13)
where the second equality follows from (10).
2.4 R&D
Denote vt as the value of an intermediate good invented at time t. The value of vt is equal to
the present value of future prots given by11
vt =
1X
s=t+1
"
s=
sY
=t+1
(1 + r )
#
. (14)
Competitive entrepreneurs employ human-capital-embodied labor HR;t for R&D. The innova-
tion process is
Nt = NtHR;t, (15)
where Nt  Nt+1   Nt. The parameter  > 0 denotes an R&D productivity parameter, and
Nt captures intertemporal knowledge spillovers as in Romer (1990). The zero-prot condition
is given by
Ntvt = wtHR;t , Ntvt = wt. (16)
2.5 Aggregation
Substituting Xt = (=)1=(1 )HY;t into Yt = H1 Y;t NtX

t yields the aggregate production func-
tion given by
Yt =



=(1 )
NtHY;t (17)
9The presence of monopolistic prots attracts potential imitation; therefore, stronger patent protection allows
monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without losing their markets to potential imitators. This
formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the ability
of the patentee to raise price".
10Given a labor share 1    of roughly two-thirds, the unconstrained markup ratio is 1= = 3, which is
unrealistically large. However, all our results are robust to the case of pt(i) = 1=.
11A new variety invented at time t will only start generating prots in the next period.
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and the amount of intermediate goods given by NtXt = Yt=. The resource constraint on
nal goods is
Ct = Yt  NtXt =

1  


Yt. (18)
The resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor input is
(1  lt   et)Ht = HY;t +HR;t. (19)
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fXt(i); Yt; Ct; HY;t; HR;t; Ht; et; ltg and prices fpt(i); wt; rt; vtg
such that the following conditions are satised:
 individuals choose fet; ltg to maximize utility taking frt+1; wt; Htg as given;
 competitive nal goods rms choose fXt(i); HY;tg to maximize prot taking fpt(i); wtg as
given;
 monopolistic intermediate goods rms choose fpt(i); Xt(i)g to maximize prot (11) taking
(10) as given;
 competitive entrepreneurs in the R&D sector employ fHR;tg to maximize prot taking
fwt; vtg as given;
 the resource constraint on nal goods holds such that Yt = NtXt + Ct;
 the resource constraint on human-capital-embodied labor holds such that HY;t + HR;t =
(1  lt   et)Ht;
 the amount of saving equals the value of assets such that wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt.
3 Parental preference for education
In this section, we explore the implications of parental preference for education on economic
growth. Section 3.1 focuses on the balanced growth path. Section 3.2 considers the transitional
paths of human capital and the equilibrium growth rate.
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3.1 Balanced growth path
Human-capital-embodied labor allocations fHY;t; HR;tg are stationary in the steady state. Then,
(13) implies that t is also stationary in the steady state. As a result, the steady-state version
of (14) simplies to v = =r. Substituting this condition into the R&D zero-prot condition in
(16), we have Nt=r = wt, where Nt = Yt(   1)= and wt is given by (9). Solving these
conditions yields
HY =

  1

1  


r

. (20)
The next step is to determine the steady-state equilibrium interest rate r. Wage income at
time t is wt(1   lt   et)Ht = wt(HY;t + HR;t), which is also the total amount of saving in the
economy at time t. The total value of assets in the economy at the end of time t is Nt+1vt,
which includes the new varieties created at time t. Given the overlapping-generation structure
of the economy, the amount of saving must equal the value of assets such that
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , wt(HY +HR) = (1 + HR)Nt=r, (21)
where Nt = Yt(  1)= and wt is given by (9). Solving these conditions, we obtain
(1  )(HY +HR)
HY
=
(1 + HR)
r

  1


, (22)
which determines the equilibrium interest rate that equates the amount of saving to the value
of assets in the economy.
Solving (7), (19), (20) and (22) yields the steady-state equilibrium values of fr; HY ; HRg.
r =

1  

  1


, (23)
HY =
1

, (24)
HR =

(1 +  + )2
  1

, (25)
which shows that HR is an inverted-U function of . From (15) and (25), the steady-state
equilibrium growth rate of technology (and also output) is given by
g  Nt
Nt
= HR =

(1 +  + )2
  1  0, (26)
which is also an inverted-U function of . Specically, the growth-maximizing value of  is given
by (1 + )= > 0. Intuitively, a higher depreciation rate  of human capital leads to a higher
steady-state level of education e that mitigates the negative e¤ect on human capital H, and
hence, a weaker education preference  is needed to reach the level of education that maximizes
the level of human-capital-embodied labor (1   l   e)H. In contrast, a stronger preference
 for leisure reduces e and requires a stronger education preference  to reach the level of
education that maximizes (1   l   e)H. To ensure that there exists an intermediate range
of  in which the steady-state equilibrium growth rate g is positive, we impose the following
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parameter restriction:  > 4(1 + ). Under this parameter restriction, there still exists a
lower bound value  of  below which g = 0, and there also exists an upper bound value  of
 above which g = 0. In other words, if  =  or  = , then HR = 0. Solving the quadratic
function  = (1 +  + )2, we derive the values of f; g given by
f; g =   2 (1 + )  
p
[  4 (1 + ) ] 
22
. (27)
We summarize these results in Proposition 1 and plot g as a function of  in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Steady-state e¤ect of education preference on growth
Proposition 1 An increase in the degree of parental preference for education has an inverted-
U e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Under a su¢ ciently low or high degree of
parental preference for education, the economy is trapped in a zero-growth equilibrium.
The intuition of the above results can be explained as follows. An increase in the degree of
parental preference for education increases education investment and human capital accumula-
tion. However, it also crowds out productive resources for R&D. Specically, if  > (1 + )=,
then any further increase in  would lead to a decrease in human-capital-embodied labor supply,
which in turn reduces the amount of resources available for innovation. In this case, a stronger
degree of parental preference for education is detrimental to economic growth. Furthermore,
in the R&D-based growth model, the market size needs to be su¢ ciently large in order for
R&D investment to be protable. Therefore, when the degree of parental preference takes on a
su¢ ciently high or low value, the market size measured by (1  l  e)H becomes so small that
there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to invest in R&D. In this case, the economy is trapped
in a stagnant equilibrium with zero economic growth.
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3.2 Transition dynamics
In this subsection, we derive the transitional dynamics of the economy. Substituting (17) into
(9) yields the following expression for the equilibrium wage rate:
wt = (1  )



=(1 )
Nt. (28)
Substituting (28) into (16) yields the following expression for the value of an invention:
vt =
1  




=(1 )
, (29)
which is stationary both on and o¤ the balanced growth path. Substituting (28) and (29) into
(21) yields
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , Nt+1 = Nt(1  lt   et)Ht. (30)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (30) yields the growth rate of technology given by
gt  Nt+1
Nt
  1 = 
(1 +  + )

Ht + (1  )(Ht)2
  1, (31)
which is decreasing in  for a given Ht due to the crowding-out e¤ect of education investment
but is increasing in Ht due to the positive e¤ect of human capital on innovation. Equation (31)
shows that the dynamics of gt is completely determined by the dynamics of Ht given by (6).
We next determine the transitional path of output. Substituting (15) and (19) into (30)
yields
Nt+1
Nt
= (1  lt   et)Ht , 1 + HR;t = (HY;t +HR;t), (32)
which shows that HY;t = 1= even when the economy is o¤ the balanced growth path. As a
result, the level of output in (17) simplies to
Yt =
1




=(1 )
Nt, (33)
which shows that Yt+1=Yt = Nt+1=Nt at any point in time.
We are now ready to examine the transitional e¤ects of a change in parental preference for
education when the degree of education preference  changes from an initial value 0 to a new
value 1. Suppose at time t = 0 the economy is at an initial steady state with  = 0. In this
case, the initial value of human capital is H0 = 0=(1 +  + 0), and the initial steady-state
equilibrium growth rate is g0j=0 = 0=(1 +  + 0)2   1. From (31), we see that when 
increases at time 0 from 0 to 1 > 0, the growth rate at time 0 immediately falls to
g0j=1 =

(1 +  + 1)

H0 + (1  )(H0)2
  1 = 1 +  + 0
1 +  + 1| {z }
<1
0
(1 +  + 0)
2
  1 (34)
10
given that H0 is predetermined. Therefore, a stronger education preference has an initial
negative impact on growth. Then, at time t = 1, the level of human capital increases to
H1 =
1
1 +  + 1
[+ (1  )H0] = 1 +  + 0
0
1
1 +  + 1| {z }
>1
0
1 +  + 0
> H0, (35)
which determines the equilibrium growth rate at time t = 1 given by
g1 =

(1 +  + 1)

H1 + (1  )(H1)2
  1 > g0j=1 , (36)
where H1 is given by (35). After the initial decrease, the equilibrium growth rate gradually
increases until it reaches the new steady state given by g = 1=(1 +  + 1)
2   1, which
may be higher or lower than the initial steady-state growth rate given that g is an inverted-
U function in  as demonstrated in (26) and Proposition 1. We summarize these results in
Proposition 2 and plot in Figure 2 the transitional paths of gt when  increases at time 0 from
0 to 1.
Figure 2: Transitional e¤ect of education preference on growth
Proposition 2 An increase in the degree of parental preference for education has an initial
negative e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate and a gradual positive e¤ect on the level of human
capital. As the level of human capital increases, the equilibrium growth rate also increases. The
new steady-state equilibrium growth rate may be higher or lower than the initial steady-state
equilibrium growth rate.
Using (31) and the transitional path of human capital in (6), we can also derive a closed-
form solution for the complete transitional path of the equilibrium growth rate from the initial
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steady state to the new steady state when  increases at time 0 from 0 to 1. From (6), the
equilibrium level of human capital at time t+ s for any s  1 is given by
Ht+s =
1
1 +  + 1

1 

(1  )1
1 +  + 1
s
+

(1  )1
1 +  + 1
s
Ht, (37)
where at time t = 0, Ht = H0 = 0=(1 +  + 0). Then, the equilibrium growth rate at time
t+ s for any s  1 is given by
gt+s =

(1 +  + 1)

Ht+s + (1  )(Ht+s)2
  1, (38)
where Ht+s is given in (37).
4 A scale-invariant extension of the model
In this section, we explore the robustness of our results by allowing for growth in human capital
and removing a scale e¤ect from the specication for technological progress.12 To begin, we
allow for growth in human capital by modifying (2) as follows.
Ht+1 = Htet + (1  )Ht, (39)
where Ht can be interpreted as an intertemporal externality e¤ect of human capital Ht on the
productivity of education et. In this case, the growth rate of human capital is given by
Ht+1  Ht
Ht
= et   . (40)
Therefore, the growth rate of human capital is now increasing in the level of education et. The
rest of the individualsoptimization problem is the same as before. Solving the individuals
optimization problem, the equilibrium levels of education et and leisure lt at any time t are
given by
et =
   (1 + ) (1  ) =
1 +  + 
, (41)
lt = 

1 + (1  ) =
1 +  + 

. (42)
Substituting (41) into (40) yields the following constant growth rate of human capital at any
time t:13
Ht+1  Ht
Ht
=
 (+ 1  )
1 +  + 
  1  gH , (43)
which is increasing in the degree  of parental preference for education. We impose parameter
restriction to ensure gH > 0.
12See Jones (1999) for a discussion of the scale e¤ect in the R&D-based growth model. Here a scale-invariant
model means that the steady-steady equilibrium growth rate of technology is constant despite a growing human-
capital-embodied labor supply.
13This condition holds regardless of whether or not the rest of the economy is on a balanced growth path.
12
To remove the scale e¤ect from the specication for technological progress, we modify (15)
as follows:14
Nt = HR;t. (44)
The rest of the model is the same as before. In this case, the growth rate of technology Nt is
given by
Nt
Nt
= 
HR;t
Nt
. (45)
On the balanced growth path, R&D labor HR;t is proportional to the stock of human capital
Ht. Therefore, a constant steady-state technology growth rate Nt=Nt in (45) implies that
the human-capital-technology ratio Ht=Nt must be constant in the long run. Therefore, the
steady-state equilibrium growth rate of technology is given by
gN = gH =
 (+ 1  )
1 +  + 
  1, (46)
which is monotonically increasing in the degree  of parental preference for education. Propo-
sition 3 summarizes this result. This long-run implication of education preference on the
steady-state equilibrium growth rate is di¤erent from the benchmark model because in the
scale-invariant model the long-run growth rate of technology is determined by the growth rate
of human capital. However, as we will show in the next subsection, a stronger preference for ed-
ucation continues to have a negative e¤ect on the transitional growth rate in the scale-invariant
model.
Proposition 3 In the scale-invariant version of the model, an increase in the degree of parental
preference for education has a positive e¤ect on the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of
technology and human capital.
4.1 Transition dynamics of the scale-invariant model
We now explore the transition dynamics of the scale-invariant model and show that the economy
converges to the balanced growth path. Substituting (44) into the zero-prot condition of R&D
in (16) yields
Ntvt = wtHR;t , vt = wt. (47)
Then, substituting (47) into the saving-asset equation in (21) yields
wt(1  lt   et)Ht = Nt+1vt , Nt+1 = (1  lt   et)Ht, (48)
where the equilibrium values of fet; ltg are given in (41) and (42). Lets dene the human-
capital-technology ratio as ht  Ht=Nt, which is a state variable. Equation (48) implies that
the law of motion for ht is given by
ht+1  Ht+1
Nt+1
=
1
(1  lt   et)
Ht+1
Ht
=
et + 1  
(1  lt   et) , (49)
14Our results in Propositions 3 and 4 are robust to a more general specication given by Nt = N

tHR;t,
where  2 (0; 1). Derivations are available upon request.
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where the second equality uses (40). In other words, the human-capital-technology ratio ht
always reaches its steady state after one period.15 Substituting (41) and (42) into (49) yields
the steady-state value of ht given by
h =


, (50)
which is increasing in the degree  of parental preference for education.
Substituting (41) and (42) into (48) yields the growth rate of technology as
Nt+1
Nt
  1 = 


+ 1  
1 +  + 

ht   1, (51)
which shows that for a given ht, an increase in the degree  of education preference at time
t leads to a temporary decrease in the growth rate of technology. Then, at time t + 1, ht+1
increases to a higher steady-state value, which in turn increases the growth rate of technology
also to a higher steady-state value given by (46). The intuition can be explained as follows.
The increase in education preference causes parents to devote more time to educating their
children, which in turn crowds out the amount of resources available for R&D investment.
This explains the initial negative e¤ect on growth. Overtime, the higher growth rate of human
capital causes technology to also increase at a higher rate. This explains the long-run positive
e¤ect on growth. We summarize this result in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 In the scale-invariant version of the model, an increase in the degree of parental
preference for education has an initial negative e¤ect on the growth rate of technology but a
positive e¤ect on the growth rate of human capital. The new steady-state equilibrium growth
rate of technology is higher than the initial steady-state equilibrium growth rate.
Finally, we consider the transitional dynamics of output Yt. Substituting (19), (44) and (47)
into the saving-asset equation in (21) yields
HY;t = Nt=. (52)
Substituting (52) into (17) yields
Yt =



=(1 )
(Nt)
2

. (53)
Therefore, the dynamics of output Yt is determined by the dynamics of technology Nt. Due
to growth in both technology and human capital, the long-run growth rate of output Yt is
gY = (1 + g

N)
2  1, where gN is given in (46). Therefore, the long-run growth rate of output is
also increasing in the degree  of parental preference for education. However, an increase in the
degree of education preference also has an initial negative e¤ect on the growth rate of output
by temporarily slowing down the rate of technological progress (i.e., the growth rate of Nt).
Therefore, the short-run implication of education preference on the transitional growth rate of
the economy is the same as in our benchmark model.
15Here one period is given by one generation, so this implication is not entirely unrealistic. In a more general
model with Nt = N

tHR;t, where  2 (0; 1), we would have a more general law of motion for ht.
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored how parental preference for education a¤ects economic growth.
Although a society such as China that has a strong preference for education accumulates more
human capital which is conducive to innovation, the larger investment in education crowds
out resources for R&D investment. As a result, a stronger parental preference for education
carries a negative e¤ect on economic growth, in addition to the conventional positive e¤ect.
Our tractable model allows us to trace out the complete transitional e¤ects of changes in this
education preference. We nd that the initial impact of an increase in the degree of education
preference on growth is always negative, which justies policymakersconcern discussed in the
introduction. In other words, a society that has a stronger preference for education would have
a lower initial growth rate but also a higher long-run growth rate than an otherwise identical
society.
Compliance with Ethical Standards: The authors declare that they have no conict of interest.
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